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Abstract
Classifiers fail to classify correctly input images that
have been purposefully and imperceptibly perturbed to
cause misclassification. This susceptability has been
shown to be consistent across classifiers, regardless of
their type, architecture or parameters. Common defenses
against adversarial attacks modify the classifer bound-
ary by training on additional adversarial examples cre-
ated in various ways. In this paper, we introduce Auto-
GAN, which counters adversarial attacks by enhancing
the lower-dimensional manifold defined by the training
data and by projecting perturbed data points onto it. Au-
toGAN mitigates the need for knowing the attack type and
magnitude as well as the need for having adversarial sam-
ples of the attack. Our approach uses a Generative Adver-
sarial Network (GAN) with an autoencoder generator and
a discriminator that also serves as a classifier. We test Au-
toGAN against adversarial samples generated with state-
of-the-art Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) as well as
samples generated with random Gaussian noise, both us-
ing the MNIST dataset. For different magnitudes of per-
turbation in training and testing, AutoGAN can surpass
the accuracy of FGSM method by up to 25% points on
samples perturbed using FGSM. Without an augmented
training dataset, AutoGAN achieves an accuracy of 89%
compared to 1% achieved by FGSM method on FGSM
testing adversarial samples.
1 Introduction
Neural network classifiers misclassify adversarial exam-
ples [30, 3], which are original input samples with im-
perceptible perturbations. There are two attributes of
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Figure 1: We show FGSM and AutoGAN method accu-
racy results for different magnitudes of FGSM perturba-
tion in training and testing. The x axis displays the magni-
tude of FGSM perturbation in training, and the y axis dis-
plays the magnitude of FGSM in testing. Where the train-
ing dataset is not augmented with additional adversarial
samples, AutoGAN accuracy surpasses FGSM method
accuracy the most – in one case 89% to 1%. Where the
training dataset is augmented with adversarial samples,
AutoGAN maintains high accuracy. FGSM method ac-
curacy deteriorates when the magnitudes of perturbation
in training and testing do not match – bottom right and
top left of the chart. AutoGAN values are means of three
measurements, FGSM values are measured once due to
no variance.
these attacks [9, 24, 32]: imperceptibility and transfer-
ability. Imperceptability (for visual datasets) means that
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these adversarial examples are largely indistinguishable
from the original images to the human eye. Transferabil-
ity [24] means that perturbed images cause misclassifica-
tion across classifiers of various types, structure and pa-
rameters [30]. The increasing deployment of Neural Net-
works (NNs) in security and safety-critical domains such
as autonomous driving [1], healthcare [6], and malware
detection [5] makes countering these attacks important.
One common defense against adversarial attacks on
machine learning applications is adversarial training [15],
which often assumes advance knowledge of the type and
magnitude of adversarial attack and availability of adver-
sarial samples of that attack. These are strong assump-
tions that cannot easily be satisfied in machine learning
applications. Even if the attack type were known, adver-
sarial samples for a particular attack might not be easy
to obtain. Hence, the need for generic algorithms against
adversarial attacks that can handle various magnitudes of
perturbation even without having additional adversarial
samples to train on.
In this paper, we design, implement and evaluate Au-
toGAN, a classifier against adversarial attacks that does
not necessitate augmentation of the dataset with adversar-
ial samples. Instead, we enhance the manifold of natural
images and project the data points onto it. It is commonly
accepted that the data points of natural image datasets oc-
cupy low-dimensional manifolds in the high-dimensional
input space [7]. Manifolds are defined as collections of
points in the input space that are connected. Each class
has a manifold associated with it, and data points are clas-
sified by considering the proximity of the point to each
class manifold, as illustrated in Figure 2. A trivial exam-
ple of a manifold would be a letter S drawn on a two-
dimensional paper surface. The space is two-dimensional
(the paper it’s drawn on), but the letter S (the line) is one-
dimensional because if pulled from both ends, it would
occupy only one dimension. AutoGAN uses a GAN with
an autoencoder generator and a discriminator that also
acts as the classifier. The presence of class labels in the
classifying discriminator makes AutoGAN reshape the
manifold for better classification. The major contributions
of this paper are:
• AutoGAN overcomes the absence of adversarial
trainings samples, which is important in cases where
attack type is not known and attack samples are not
available. Figure 1 shows that without an augmented
dataset, AutoGAN gets an accuracy of 89% com-
pared to 1% achieved with FGSM method on FGSM
adversarial samples.
• AutoGAN is able to handle different magnitudes
of training/testing adversarial perturbation, which is
relevant when the magnitude of an attack is not
known in advance. Figure 1 shows that AutoGAN
can surpass the accuracy of FGSM method by up to
25% points when the training dataset is augmented.
• AutoGAN handles different kinds of adversarial at-
tacks: samples from adversarial directions generated
with state-of-the-art FGSM method – Section 4.1,
and samples from random directions generated with
Gaussian noise per pixel – Section 4.2.
• AutoGAN is less exposed to adversarial attacks since
the logic of countering these attacks is contained in
both the generator and the discriminator, Section 4.3,
but only the discriminator can be accessed by attack-
ers.
2 Related work
Vulnerability to adversarial attacks has been attributed
to several factors. Among these factors are the extreme
nonlinearity of deep networks [30]; and linear behav-
ior in high-dimensional spaces [9], leading to the FGSM
method of adversarial direction. Szegedy et al. [30], Song
et al. [29] and Trame`r et al. [32] have attributed the sus-
ceptibility to adversarial attacks to low probability pock-
ets in the manifold.
GAN framework First introduced by Goodfellow et
al. [8], the GAN framework sets two networks, a gen-
erator and a discriminator, against each other with com-
peting losses. The generator has the goal to find a func-
tion that maps a random input vector to a realistic image.
The discriminator has the goal to distinguish the gener-
ated image from real images. Among improvements to the
GAN framework, the generated images have been made
more realistic by making the generator network an au-
toencoder [34], where the generator input is not a random
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Figure 2: Illustration of the manifold gaps that cause ad-
versarial attacks. There is a small pocket of space in
the manifold that lacks data points from the square class.
Classifiers aim to maintain same distance from points of
different classes. This causes them to pass roughly in the
same region of space. Due to the manifold gap, all classi-
fiers shift towards the gap to maintain same distance from
points of different classes. As a result, in the vicinity of
the gap, all classifiers are surrounded by space the points
of which would belong to one of the classes. They all
misclassify the data points shown as adversarial samples,
which are between the classifiers and the perfect bound-
ary.
vector but a dataset image. This enables generated images
to stay close to the manifold of natural images [34]. An
autoencoder generator also enables the latent representa-
tion of the autoencoder to represent the low-dimensional
manifold of the input data and allows for navigation of the
manifold, for example, interpolation between two points
along the manifold. Another improvement to the GAN
framework has been the incorporation of the class labels
into the discriminator labels, for example, for better image
quality [27, 21] or for label efficiency [20].
Generation of adversarial samples Many efforts have
explored generation of adversarial samples. The FGSM
method [9] identifies directions in the input space that
reduce the most the probability of correct classification
as adversarial directions. Given a target model h, an in-
put image x, its label y, the loss function L(h(x), ytrue),
FGSM creates adversarial samples by adding perturbation
to input images:
xadvFGSM = x+  · sign(OxL(h(x), ytrue)). (1)
In addition to FGSM adversarial directions, random ad-
versarial directions can also be identified, for example
with random Gaussian noise added to pixels [30]. Sabour
et al. [26] generate adversarial samples by manipulating
the deep representation of images to make them look like
other specific images to neural networks. Ensemble Ad-
versarial Training [31] augment the training data with
perturbations from other models. Ensemble Adversarial
Training decouples the generation of adversarial samples
and the model being trained to counter adversarial attacks
because adversarial perturbations can be transferred from
one NN to another due to the transferability of adversarial
attacks. Other efforts use GANs [8, 25] to generate adver-
sarial training examples [33, 2, 11, 14]. Xiao et al. [33]
generate adversarial examples with adversarial networks,
where GANs generate the perturbations. Kos et al. [14]
utilize variational autoencoder (VAE) and VAE-GAN for
generation of adversarial training examples. Baluja et
al. [2] uses two approaches for generation of adversarial
samples: perturbation in residual blocks in residual net-
works; adversarial autoencoding using regularizers.
Defense against adversarial attacks Current defense
approaches against adversarial attacks can largely be clas-
sified into two types. The first type are methods that
make the model architecture more robust. The second
type are methods that change the adversarial samples to
make them less adversarial.
The most common method of the first type is adversar-
ial training by Kurakin et al. [15], where the dataset is
augmented with adversarial samples, often of the same
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kind as the attack, and the classifier is retrained. Ad-
versarial training augments the dataset by filling out low-
probability gaps with additional data points and then re-
training the classifier to find a better boundary. The draw-
back of adversarial training is that it only provides de-
fense against the attack model that was used to generate
the augmentation adversarial samples and not against oth-
ers. FGSM [9] method uses adversarial training. Virtual
Adversarial Training (VAT) by Miyato et al. [19] iden-
tifies directions that can deviate the inferred output dis-
tribution the most and smoothes the output distribution
in these anisotropic directions. VAT is also applicable to
semi-supervised applications. Defensive distillation [23]
by Papernot et al. extracts knowledge for improving a net-
work’s own resilience to adversarial attacks. It is based on
the distillation training procedure [10], which trains a NN
using knowledge from a different NN. Defensive distilla-
tion adapts distillation to use the knowledge to improve its
own resilience, instead of transferring it to another NN. In
addition, it makes generation of adversarial samples more
costly by increasing the average minimum number of fea-
tures that need to be changed for generation of adversar-
ial samples. Madry et al. [17] use robust optimization
towards deep learning models resistant to adversarial at-
tacks. Izmailov et al. [12] identify enablers of adversarial
attacks and focus on featurization of data as a method to
innoculate against adversarial examples.
Second type methods identify adversarial samples and
move them towards the data distribution or the natural
data manifold. Defense-GAN by Samangouei et al. [28]
uses a GAN with a generator to project adversarial points
onto the manifold of natural images. Given an input point
that is potentially adversarial, Defense-GAN does sev-
eral random initializations in the latent space and chooses
from them a latent space seed that generates the closest
match to the input. The closest match is considered as the
projection of the original input point, though due to the
randomness and depending on the number of random ini-
tializations, this projection might end up far from the real
projection of the point on the manifold. Defense-GAN
uses a classifier to which GAN input or GAN output or
both GAN input and GAN output data points are used.
Magnet by Meng et al. [18] also moves adversarial sam-
ples towards the manifold of natural images by utilizing
an autoencoder or a collection of autoencoders. It con-
tains several detector networks that detect adversarial ex-
amples from the distance between the original image and
the reconstructed image. The reformer network moves
adversarial samples towards the manifold. Jha et al. [13]
focus on identification of adversarial samples. They first
identify a low-dimensional manifold where training sam-
ples lie. Then, based on the distance of new observed
data points from this manifold, points are identified as ad-
versarial or not. PixelDefend by Song et al. [29] proposes
generative models to move adversarial images towards the
distribution seen in the data. PixelDefend identifies adver-
sarial samples with statistical methods (p-value) and finds
more probable samples by generating similar images and
looking for highest probability images within a distance
from a given image.
Summary Existing methods either change classifiers to
make them more robust to adversarial attacks or move
adversarial points to make them less adversarial, but not
both because it is not straightforward to do so. In contrast,
AutoGAN employs both of these defenses by enhancing
the manifold and changing its discriminator classifier at
the same time as moving adversarial points toward the
enhanced manifold to make them less adversarial. In con-
trast to other methods, AutoGAN does not identify adver-
sarial samples explicitly.
AutoGAN uses the GAN framework because it has
been successful in reconstructing manifolds of natural im-
ages. In distinction to other methods that also use GANs
against adversarial attacks, the generator of AutoGAN
is an autoencoder because it outputs more realistic im-
ages and enables navigation of and better adherence to
the manifold. In the discriminator, AutoGAN incorpo-
rates class labels into both categories of discriminator la-
bels, TRUE and FALSE which results in the AutoGAN
discriminator having twice the number of labels of the
dataset. Other methods that are doing the same only in-
corporate labels into one category. AutoGAN uses its dis-
criminator also as a classifier, which is not only parsimo-
nious for resources, but also utilizes what the discrimina-
tor has already learned.
We evaluate AutoGAN against adversarial samples
in adversarial directions generated with the FGSM
method [9]. To further assess that the scope of Auto-
GAN is not only limited to adversarial directions, we eval-
uate AutoGAN against adversarial attacks in random di-
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rections created by adding random Gaussian noise to each
pixel.
3 Our approach: AutoGAN
In this section, we detail our approach for countering ad-
versarial attacks. AutoGAN belongs to both types of com-
mon approaches against adversarial attacks described in
Section 2. It belongs to the first type because AutoGAN
changes the manifold of images by enhancing it. It also
belongs to the second type of approaches because Auto-
GAN moves adversarial samples towards the manifold by
projecting them onto it. By design, our AutoGAN method
is agnostic of attack method and does not need additional
adversarial training points, but can benefit from them.
Motivation In our view, adversarial attacks can be ex-
plained with the presence of gaps in the manifolds of nat-
ural images [30, 29, 32], caused by non-uniformly dis-
tributed sampling of the data points. These gaps cause
widening of the margin between the points of different
classes. Classifiers, in general, aim to maintain the same
distance from points of different classes. Since the man-
ifold gap affects the in-between space between classes,
the boundaries of the classifiers are affected as well. The
boundaries get shifted towards the gap region, as depicted
in Figure 2.
Both defining characteristics of adversarial attacks are
explainable with this view that explains adversarial at-
tacks with gaps in the manifold of images. The transfer-
ability of adversarial attacks across diverse classifiers can
be explained because though they may be diverse, clas-
sifiers will aim to place boundaries with roughly equal
margins from the data points of the different classes, as
illustrated in Figure 2. Having parts of the manifold un-
populated changes the margins between the classes and
causes the classifying boundary to shift towards the area
of the manifold where the gap is. Here, in the vicinity of
the shifted boundary, the space on both its sides belongs
to the same class, yet only one side is classified correctly.
As can be seen in Figure 2, crossing the various classi-
fier boundaries in the area close to the gap causes mis-
classification, however small the changes may be. This
would explain the imperceptibility property of adversarial
attacks, their second property.
The manifold gap view also explains what the com-
monly employed defense – adversarial training [15] –
does. Adversarial training fills up the unpopulated gaps in
the manifold with additional points, after which retraining
on the augmented dataset redraws the classifying bound-
ary. However, AutoGAN aims to cause the classifying
boundary to be redrawn without augmenting the original
dataset with additional adversarial samples by reposition-
ing the points for better classification, thus changing the
shape of the manifold towards better classification. This
is motivated by the lack of knowledge of the attack type
and magnitude, and the potential unavailability of adver-
sarial samples for the particular attack. This knowledge
and these samples are assumed to be available in various
methods against adversarial attacks. Though AutoGAN
does not necessitate augmenting the training data with ad-
versarial points, it can benefit from additional adversarial
points, as shown in Figure 1.
GAN choice We chose to use a GAN in our approach
because GANs have been shown to be very good at re-
constructing manifolds of natural image datasets in orig-
inal high-dimensional input spaces. GANs also enable
navigation and manipulation of the manifold. AutoGAN
assumes no augmentation of training dataset with adver-
sarial samples. For the purpose of repositioning the exist-
ing data points, a GAN [8, 25] is well-suited since it is the
best current method to reconstruct manifolds of natural
image datasets in original high-dimensional input spaces.
In particular, GANs where the generator is an autoencoder
result in more realistic results [34] because they avoid im-
ages falling off the natural image manifold by not start-
ing from random input vectors. The latent representation
of the generator in such a GAN is essentially the low-
dimensional manifold of the images and it allows us to
navigate and manipulate the manifold of images, for ex-
ample to do interpolation between two points, as illus-
trated also by Zhu et al. [34] and described by Goodfel-
low et al. [8]. The interpolation between two data points
depicted in Figure 3 cannot be done in the original in-
put space, but can be achieved by training the dataset in
a GAN that has an autoencoder generator. Then two data
points are passed through the generator up to the latent
space, where their latent representation is obtained. Other
points between them are found using linear interpolation
5
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Figure 3: This figure shows how the latent representa-
tion of a GAN gives us a handle for the manipulation of
the manifold. It shows how a GAN with an autoencoder
generator allows us to navigate the manifold of images.
Here, only the first and final images are among the natu-
ral dataset images, in this case a three and an seven. The
in-between images have been obtained by interpolating in
the latent space of the GAN, which allows us to effectively
navigate the manifold.
in the latent space. Finally, all the points are projected
to the output of the generator. Thus, a smooth transition
between the input images along the manifold is obtained,
which is shown in Figure 3. AutoGAN incorporates class
labels into both TRUE and FALSE labels that a normal
GAN has. For a binary classification problem with digits
three and seven, this means having 4 labels in the discrim-
inator: TRUE-THREE, TRUE-SEVEN, FALSE-THREE,
FALSE-SEVEN as depicted in Figure 4. The presence of
labels that distinguish TRUE and FALSE images ensures
that, just like in GANs, the manifold at the output of the
autoencoder is aimed to be a reconstruction of the input
manifold of natural images. The additional presence of
class labels means that the discriminator is also aiming
to get the classification right at the same time. This ap-
proach of using a GAN discriminator with more than two
Input
Images
AutoGAN Label
probabilities
TRUE-THREE
TRUE-SEVEN
FALSE-THREE
FALSE-SEVEN
Class
probabilities
THREE
SEVEN
AutoGAN
input
AutoGAN
output
Figure 4: Illustration of how AutoGAN finds the label
of an input image. The probability that an image is a
digit three is the sum of the probability that the image
is a TRUE-THREE and the probability that the image is a
FALSE-THREE. The same for digit seven.
labels has been used for label efficiency [20] as well as
for improved image quality [27, 21]. In contrast to these
methods, AutoGAN has twice the number of original la-
bels.
AutoGAN findings We have discovered through our
experiments in Section 4.3, illustrated in Figure 5, that
AutoGAN projects unperturbed points onto themselves in
the output manifold. In other words, AutoGAN does pre-
serve the original manifold. However, we have also found
cases where perturbed images do not seem to have been
projected onto the original manifold – images on the right
of Figure 5. From these findings, we conclude that, in
addition to preserving the original manifold, AutoGAN
enhances it while also projecting points onto it for better
classification. In the middle case on the right side of Fig-
ure 5, it seems that the projection of perturbed data points
preserves the edges of the digits for better classification.
AutoGAN architecture Figure 6 shows that our design
uses a GAN with an autoencoder generator. Additionally,
in our design, the discriminator has four labels instead of
two. In GANs, there are two labels, TRUE and FALSE
to make the GAN reconstruct the manifold of images. In
AutoGAN, we incorporate the image classes into the dis-
criminator TRUE and FALSE labels. This is done with
the purpose of reconstructing a manifold that leads to bet-
ter classification.
The generator of the AutoGAN is an autoencoder that
6
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Figure 5: We show projections of original/unperturbed
testing images from MNIST dataset and projections of the
same images perturbed with the FGSM method at differ-
ent magnitudes. The results are for 3 cases of training and
testing perturbation magnitudes in AutoGAN. On the left,
we see that original, unperturbed images get projected
onto themselves, meaning that that they are projected onto
the original input manifold. On the right are perturbed im-
ages of original MNIST dataset images and their projec-
tions onto the output manifold. The images on the right
with the 0.15-0.25 perturbation magnitudes indicate that
perturbed images are not always projected onto the origi-
nal manifold – their projections do not look like MNIST
images. This indicates that AutoGAN can also enhance
the manifold for better classification. The projections of
perturbed images with the 0.15-0.25 perturbation magni-
tudes look like they have preserved only the edges of the
digits and have disposed of the perturbations elsewhere.
takes MNIST images as input and outputs images of the
same size as MNIST images. The first part of the autoen-
coder has two convolutional layers with 32 feature maps
each and ReLu activation. Each Convolutional layer is
followed by a 2-by-2 MaxPooling layer. The second part
of the autoencoder also has two convolutional layers with
32 feature maps each and ReLu activation. A 2-by-2 Max-
Pooling layer follows each Convolutional layer. It also has
a final convolutional layer with just one feature map and
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Figure 6: Illustration of AutoGAN architecture and the
convolutional network architecture. The generator is an
autoencoder where the size of the latent representation is
smaller than the size of the input and output images. The
discriminator outputs four labels, instead of the usual two
labels, TRUE and FALSE, in GANs. We display also the
layers of the generator and the discriminator.
sigmoid activation. All convolutional layers use 3-by-3
kernels. The autoencoder is compiled with the Adadelta
optimizer and the loss is binary crossentropy. The layers
of the generator are discplayed in Figure 6. The genera-
tor is compiled with the Adadelta compiler and the loss
is binary crossentropy. Learning rate values are default
values.
The discriminator is a neural network with two convo-
lutional layers with 3-by-3 kernels and ReLu activations.
The two convolutional layers have 32 and 64 feature maps
and are followed by a 2-by-2 maxpooling layer, and then
a dropout layer with a 0.25 rate. This is followed by a
dense layer with 128 units, another dropout layer with a
0.5 rate, and finally a dense layer of four units. All lay-
ers except the final one have ReLu activation, while the
final dense layer has softmax activation. The discrimina-
tor is compiled with the Adadelta compiler and the loss
is categorical crossentropy. The default classifier that is
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used to compare the performace of AutoGAN against has
the exact same architecture, with the difference that the fi-
nal dense layer only has 2 units. The adversarial model is
compiled with an SGD optimizer and with binary crossen-
tropy loss. The layers of the discriminator are discplayed
in Figure 6. The learning rates have default values.
3.1 Classification with AutoGAN discrimi-
nator
AutoGAN uses the discriminator for classification after
training on the dataset by summing up label probabili-
ties. In a GAN, the discriminator uses the labels TRUE
and FALSE to discriminate between original input and
generated input. In AutoGAN, the discriminator incor-
porates the class distinction into its TRUE and FALSE
labels so as to distinguish the digits three and seven.
Within each of the original labels, there are two cases
for each class. As a result, the AutoGAN discriminator
has 4 labels: TRUE-THREE, FALSE-THREE, TRUE-
SEVEN, FALSE-SEVEN. During testing, an image first
goes through the generator, which projects it onto the out-
put manifold. Then it is classified by the discriminator,
yielding four probabilities, one for each label. The prob-
ability of each class – digit three or seven – is calculated
as the sum of the probabilities that this image belongs to
that class, either as original input or as a generated image.
For example, the probability that an image is a digit three
is the sum of the probability of label TRUE-THREE and
the probability of label FALSE-THREE. The image gets
classified to the class with the highest probability. This is
illustrated in Figure 4.
4 Experiments and Results
For FGSM adversarial attacks, we assume that the at-
tacker has access to the neural network model. For at-
tacks with random Gaussian noise, we don’t assume ac-
cess to the neural network since the attacks are generated
randomly.
We used the MNIST dataset [16] for binary classifica-
tion of digits three and seven, following Goodfellow et
al. [9]. We implementated our approach with Keras [4].
The training is done in random batches of 32 images.
After 60 iterations, new testing samples and new train-
ing samples (when applicable) are generated. The best
result within 50 epochs is reported. We report the mean
of three measurements for all AutoGAN measurements
and default classifier measurements. Because there was
no variance in repeated FGSM measurements, we report
single measurements for FGSM results. We benchmark
AutoGAN robustness to FGSM adversarial attack using
v2.1.0 of CleverHans [22]. The training set gets modified
by the FGSM method with a range of max norm  values:
0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4. The testing set is modified by the
FGSM method with a range of max norm  values: 0.1,
0.2, 0.3, 0.4. We also benchmark AutoGAN robustness
to attacks in random adversarial directions, where image
pixels have Gaussian noise added with a 0 mean and up
to 1 standard deviation. CleverHans [22] takes as input
the original MNIST dataset, the classifier (in our case, the
AutoGAN discriminator), and the magnitude of perturba-
tion and outputs adversarial samples. At each iteration,
new training (if augmenting the training dataset) and test-
ing get generaated. The testing samples are used to get
intermediate accuracy results from the discriminator clas-
sifier. Another iteration of the training follows where the
new adversarial training samples are used.
4.1 AutoGAN outperforms FGSM in
FGSM adversarial attacks
For adversarial attacks in FGSM adversarial directions,
we compare AutoGAN accuracy to FGSM [9] method ac-
curacy on adversarial samples generated with the FGSM
method. We can categorize the cases when AutoGAN ac-
curacy is distinctly better than FGSM method accuracy:
• Figure 1 shows results when the training dataset has
not been augmented with adversarial samples – the
first column. This includes the best improvement
AutoGAN makes, from 1% with FGSM method to
89% with AutoGAN.
• Figure 1 also shows results when the magnitudes of
perturbation in training and testing do not match –
bottom right and top left of the chart. Here, Au-
toGAN outperforms FGSM method by up to 25%
points.
In general, AutoGAN benefits from adversarial train-
ing, which can be seen by comparing AutoGAN accuracy
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Figure 7: We compare the performance of AutoGAN
and FGSM when trained without adversarial samples and
tested with adversarial samples of various magnitudes of
FGSM perturbation. Despite not being trained with ad-
versarial samples, the AutoGAN method maintains a high
accuracy when tested with adversarial samples of various
magnitudes. On the other hand, the FGSM method and
the default neural network classifer are able to handle only
a small magnitude of FGSM perturbation; beyond that the
accuracy values go down consistently with the magnitude
of the FGSM perturbation.
values in the first column (where there is no augmenta-
tion) with AutoGAN accuracy values in the other columns
(where there is augmentation).
Figure 7 focuses on the first column of data in Fig-
ure 1, because this is where AutoGAN’s improvement
over FGSM method is the largest. This is the case
where there is no adversarial training, the original train-
ing dataset has not been augmented with adversarial sam-
ples. This is also the likely scenario in machine learn-
ing applications, where the kind of attack is not known
in advance. From Figure 7, we can see that the Auto-
GAN maintains high accuracy even for high magnitudes
of adversarial perturbation in testing. In the best case, the
accuracy goes up to 87% from FGSM’s 1%.
4.2 AutoGAN outperforms default classi-
fier on attacks in random adversarial
direction
To investigate whether AutoGAN is capable of handling
other kinds of adversarial perturbation as well, we test it
on samples with perturbation in random directions in the
input space – Gaussian noise added independently to each
pixel with a 0 mean and standard deviation up to 1. Fig-
ure 8 shows the accuracy results for AutoGAN in compar-
ison to a default classifier that has the same architecture
as the AutoGAN discriminator but only two labels, one
for each class instead of the four labels the discriminaotr
has. All results are means of three measurements. The
results on Figure 8 show that AutoGAN accuracy exceeds
the accuracy of the default classifier, by up to 49% points.
AutoGAN performs better than a default classifier in both
cases with or without augmentation of the training dataset
with adversarial samples.
4.3 AutoGAN enhances the manifold
To investigate how the shape of the output manifold
changes in comparison to the input manifold, we project
images onto the output manifold. To project the images,
we pass them through the autoencoder generator. The ex-
periments are performed for several values of perturbation
magnitudes in training and testing and the results of the
experiments are displayed in Figure 5. On the left are un-
perturbed images and their projections, where we can see
that the projections are the same as the original images.
This indicates that AutoGAN does preserve the original
manifold. On the right are perturbed images and their pro-
jections, where we can see that the projections are differ-
ent from the input perturbed images. More importantly,
we can see in the middle digits on the right, the projec-
tions do not resemble digits from the MNIST dataset. This
indicates that AutoGAN has not projected these perturbed
images on the original manifold. From this we conclude
that AutoGAN must have enhanced the original manifold
and then projected perturbed images onto the enhance-
ment.
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Figure 8: We compare the performance of a default neu-
ral network classifier and AutoGAN when trained with
and without adversarial samples and tested with adversar-
ial samples, both generated by adding Gaussian noise of
various magnitudes. Here, we see that AutoGAN perfor-
mance always exceeds default classifier performance, by
up to 49% points. In particular, the first column where
there is no augmentation of the training dataset with ad-
versarial samples displays the most benefit from Auto-
GAN. The structure of the default classifier is the same
as that of the AutoGAN discriminator, except the number
of labels is two, one for each class. All results are means
of three measurements.
4.4 AutoGAN generator and discriminator
both needed against adversarial attacks
We further investigated whether the reshaping of the man-
ifold by the AutoGAN generator was enough for better
classification or whether the discriminator was needed
as well for better classification. In other words, could
the discriminator be replaced with a default classifier?
We evaluated a default classifier without augmenting the
training dataset with adversarial samples. We trained Au-
toGAN as previously described. Then we trained a default
classifier on data points after they go through the gener-
ator. The default classifier had the same structure as the
discriminator with the only difference being the number
of labels – the default classifier had only two class labels.
Table 1: Classification results after using a default classi-
fier instead of the AutoGAN discriminator for the classi-
fication
Magnitude of FGSM
testing perturbation 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Accuracy (%) 50 50 1 3
As Table 1 shows, the classification results were not good
when replacing the AutoGAN discriminator with a default
classifier. As a result, we conclude that the classification
logic of the AutoGAN is contained in both the generator
and the discriminator. They are both needed in achiev-
ing the AutoGAN accuracy results. This has security im-
plications because if the logic for countering adversarial
attacks is contained in both the generator and the discrim-
inator, it means that AutoGAN is more robust against at-
tackers since only the discriminator can be exposed to at-
tackers.
5 Conclusions
We have designed, implemented and evaluated a novel
AutoGAN classifier that is resilient against adversarial at-
tacks. Unlike other defense methods, AutoGAN employs
at the same time two defenses, which we think explains its
resilience – AutoGAN changes the model to make it more
robust and also moves adversarial points to make them
less adversarial. Though AutoGAN can benefit from aug-
menting its training dataset with adversarial samples, it
maintains accuracy even without them. This matters since
attack type might not be known and adversarial samples
might not be available. AutoGAN achieves 89% accu-
racy compared to FGSM’s 1% in the best case without
augmentation. AutoGAN is also able to maintain high
accuracy for different magnitudes of perturbation in train-
ing and testing, exceeding FGSM accuracy by up to 25%
points on adversarial samples perturbed by the FGSM
method. Against adversarial attacks in random adversar-
ial directions, AutoGAN performs consistently well, even
without augmentation of the training dataset.
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